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Abstract—Openflow provides a standard interface for sepa-
rating a network into a data plane and a programmatic control
plane. This enables easy network reconfiguration, but introduces
the potential for programming bugs to cause network effects.
To study OpenFlow switch behavior, we used Alloy to create a
software abstraction describing the internal state of a network
and its OpenFlow switches. This work is an attempt to model the
static and dynamic behaviour a network built using OpenFlow
switches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a technique used in
computer networking to decouple the control plane and the
data plane of the network. SDN employs a centralized soft-
ware program to automatically configure and control network
switches. switches. SDN helps researchers to write high level
programs to control network behavior instead of manually
configuring and manipulating policies in traditional network
switches. OpenFlow is the first standard communication in-
terface defined between the control and forwarding layers of
an SDN architecture. OpenFlow is an open API to remotely
control forwarding tables of switches by adding and removing
flow entries [14]. OpenFlow provides an easy interface for
changing network configurations, but also enables software
bugs to impact network behavior. This raises a number of
questions: ”Does changing configurations via OpenFlow cause
any security breaches or inconsistencies in switches? Can it
cause undesired network behaviors unknown to the network
operator?”
In this report, we will use Alloy, a lightweight modeling
language, to create a software abstraction describing the static
structure and dynamic behavior of the OpenFlow network.
Using this model, in future work we aim to answer the
aforementioned questions about OpenFlow switch networks.
The remainder of the paper is laid our as follows.
In section II we describe Software Defined Networks in
more detail, and introduce the fundamental concepts of the
Alloy language.
Section III discusses the key components of an OpenFlow
switch. We explain the static model of an OpenFlow switch in
IV and the dynamic model in V. Related work on SDN design
and verification is reviewed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper and discusses our future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Software Defined Networks
In SDN the data forwarding plane is separated from control
plane , which is managed by a network OS. The network OS
(such as Nox [5], POX [13],Beacon [1], or ONIX [10]) controls
the whole network from a central point. It controls the data
plane via interfaces such as OpenFlow [14]. Accordingly, the
functionality of a network can be defined and changed after
SDN has been physically deployed. Hence, changing network
switch’s rules, prioritizing, de-prioritizing or even blocking/re-
routing packet flows is facilitated a very fine-grained level of
control.
A software defined controller allows us to trace and manage
specific flows in a flexible approach based on packets’ header
information (such as packet’s source/destination address).
OpenFlow is the first standard communications interface
defined between the control and forwarding layers of an
SDN architecture. OpenFlow facilitates the software defined
routing of packets through the network of switches and also
provides sophisticated traffic management. The basic idea of
OpenFlow is to exploit the concept of flow-tables (already
used in Ethernet switches) for different applications such
as implementing firewalls, QoS and NAT. Employing this
notion, OpenFlow provides a protocol in order to program
the flow-tables for routing packets and managing flow traffics.
More importantly, using OpenFlow, network administrators
can separate production and research traffic. Hence this gives
the researcher the ability to implement and test new routing
protocols, security models or even alternatives to IP [14] on
real-world networks. Figure 1 shows a network of OpenFlow
switches.In this example, all the switches are managed by only
one controller. In general based on OpenFlow specification, a
switch can be controlled by more than one Controller.
Every OpenFlow switch consists of at least three parts [17]:
(1) A set of Flow Tables (at least one table). Each table has
a set of flow entries. Each entry comprises a set of actions
that will be applied to the packet when it matches that entry,
(2) A Secure Channel for communication with corresponding
controller(s), (3) and OpenFlow as the standard protocol for
communication with controller(s) [14].
More details on the OpenFlow switch are presented in
section III.
Fig. 1: Example of a network with three switches and one controller.
B. Alloy Modelling Language
Alloy is a declarative specification language for modeling
complex structures and behaviors in a system. Alloy is based
on first order logic [7] and is designed for model checking.
An Alloy model is a relational model which can consist of:
• Signatures: represent the entities in a system.
• Relations: which relates a signature to another signa-
ture.
• Facts: specify the constraints on the signatures which
are assumed to always hold.
• Predicates: specify the constraints which can be used
to show operations.
• Functions: are alternative names for expressions that
return some result.
• Assertions: constraints which are checked over the
model.
The Alloy Analyzer takes an Alloy model and checks it against
its constraints. It translates the Alloy model into a boolean
expression which is analyzed by the SAT solver embedded in
the analyzer. The Alloy Analyzer generates instances of model
invariants satisfying model constraints and then checks spec-
ified properties on these instances. It just returns the models
within the user-specified scope, consisting of a finite number
of objects. The result is turned into a graphical representation
of a model instance.
Besides finding satisfying instances, the Alloy Analyzer
also checks assertions. If there is a model within the scope
which does not satisfy the assertions, it will return the model
as a counterexample. However if no instance is found, the
assertion may still be not valid in a larger scope.
C. Examples:
The general syntax for defining a signature in Alloy is as
follows:
sig A fields
This line defines signature A with some fields. For instance
1 some sig Switch{tables: some Table}
2 sig SwState{sw: one Switch, BuffMsg: set (Port->Message)}
Fig. 2: Example of a signature in Alloy.
1 pred receive(s,s’ : SwitchState, m:Message){
2 s’.switch = s.switch
3 s’.sInBuffMsg = s.sInBuffMsg + m
4 s’.sOutBuffMsg = s.sOutBuffMsg
5 s’.sTables = s.sTables
6 }
Fig. 3: Example of a predicate in Alloy.
Figure 2 shows two entities in Alloy which are defined using
keyword sig. Line 1 defines the Switch entity with a field
Table. Signature SwState shows the state of the network
at each time epoch. SwSatet has two relations, switch
and a set of buffered messages (BuffMsg) mapping ports to
Messages.
Operations that modify the state of network may be mod-
eled as predicates using the pred keyword. The syntax is:
pred Name [parameters] f
This line defines a predicate, with the given name and (possibly
empty) parameters. A predicate always produces true or false,
so no type is needed. The result is defined by the formula f,
which may reference the parameters. Figure 3 specifies how
the state changes when a new message is received. s indicates
the current state and s’ indicates the next state after receiving
a new message. Upon receiving a message the only change
is the relations between switch state and the set of buffered
messages. The new message is added to the buffer, but the
other relations stay unchanged.
Facts express constraints on signatures and the relations that
must always hold in the model. The following syntax shows
how to define a fact:
fact Name e
You can name a fact if you wish. The analyzer will ignore
the names. The expression e is a constraint that the analyzer
will assume is always true. For instance the fact in Figure 4
implies the next table of every switch table should be in the
same switch. Using following syntax a function can be defined
in Alloy:
fun Name [parameters] : type e
This line defines a function, with the given name and (possibly
empty) parameters, and outputting a relation (or a set, or scalar)
of the given type type. The result is defined by the expression
e, which may reference the parameters. For instance Figure 5
presents an example of a function in Alloy. This function finds
the set of switches’ ports (from set of all input ports ports)
connected to a set of controllers (c).
An Alloy assertion can be defined using the following syntax:
assert Name f
This line defines a assertion, with the given name. Assertions
take no parameters. An assertion always produces true or false,
1 fact {all s:Switch, t: s.tables | t.nxTable in s.tables}
Fig. 4: Example of an Alloy fact
2
1 fun findCPort(c: set Controller, ports: set Port): set Port
2 {
3 (connect.(c.ports)) & ports
4 }
Fig. 5: Example of a function in Alloy.
1 assert Acyclic{ no t: Table | t in t.ˆnxTable }
2 check Acyclic for 5
Fig. 6: Example of an assertion in Alloy.
so no type is needed. The property that is going to be checked
is defined by the formula f. Figure 6 depicts an example of
an assertion in Alloy. Acyclic asserts there is no loop in the
tables’ chain. This assertion is checked in all models with at
most 5 elements of each signature.
So far Alloy’s basics which we are going to use in our code
are explained. In the following sections the Alloy code for
modelling the OpenFlow switch is presented.
III. SWITCH STRUCTURE
A. OpenFlow Tables
Any Openflow switch has at least one Flow Table. Each
table may have a pointer to another table as the next table.
There is no pointer to the first table, and this table is called
the root table.
A Flow Table consists of some flow entries. Different
components of each flow entries are:
• Match fields: to match against packets. These consist
of the ingress port and packet headers, and optionally
metadata specified by a previous table.
• Counters to update for matching packets.
• Instructions to apply to matching packets.
1) Match Fields: In our model of an OpenFlow switch a
very simplified version of the match fields is modeled. For a
complete set of match fields that a packet is compared against,
see the current OpenFlow switch specification [17]. Currently
a packet is compared against the ingress port, source IP and
destination IP. Each match field in a flow table has a priority
field. If more than one match fields match with an incoming
packed, the one with higher priority will be triggered.
2) Counters: Counters are stored statistics that can be
maintained for each flow, port, table, etc. In current work,
a very simplified version of counters in the static model of
OpenFlow switches is presented.
3) Overview: A set of instructions is associated with every
flow entry. This set of instructions is executed whenever an
incoming packet matches the corresponding entry. In this ver-
sion of the OpenFlow switch model the following instructions
are modeled:
• Apply-Action action(s): A specific set of actions
is immediately applied while the current action set
(associated with the packet) remains unchanged.
• Clear-Action: clear the associated action set.
• Write-Action action(s): Add a specific set of actions
to the current actions set.
• Goto-Table next-table-id: continue the pipe-lining
process (described in next section) from table with
ID equal to next-table-id. The next-table-id must be
greater than the current table-id.
4) Action Set: Each incoming packet has an action set
which is initially empty. Using Write-Action and Clear-Action,
the action set can be modified whenever the packet matches
an entry. An action set contains at most one action of
each type. In order to have multiple actions of the same
type, the Apply-Action instruction can be used. There are
currently two types of action in the OpenFlow specification:
required and optional [17]. No optional action is modeled in
the current work. Supported required actions in this model are:
output:
• Forward-to-Port port: forward the packet to port.
• Forward-to-Controller controller: forward the
packet to a specific controller.
• Forward-to-Ingress: forward the packet to the ingress
port (the port that packet has been received from).
• Forward-to-All: forward the packet to all outgoing
ports.
Drop: Drop the packet. This action also can be applied
implicitly for those packet whose action sets have no output
action.
B. Matching a packet with flow entries
If a packet matches a flow entry in a flow table, the
corresponding instruction set is executed. The instructions in
the flow entry may explicitly direct the packet to another flow
table, where the same process is repeated again. A flow entry
can only direct a packet to a flow table number which is
greater than its own flow table number, in other words pipeline
processing can only go forward and not backward. Obviously,
the flow entries of the last table of the pipe-line can not include
the Goto instruction. If the matching flow entry does not direct
packets to another flow table, pipe-line processing stops at this
table and the corresponding action set will be executed. Packet
flow through an OpenFlow switch is presented in Figure 7.
IV. STATIC MODEL OF OPENFLOW SWITCH
Our Alloy model enables us to model states of one switch
and its interaction with other nodes in the network. We first
describe the entities in our model and then we introduce the
constraints on the entities. These constraints (modeled using
Alloy facts) help us to model the correct structure of an
OpenFlow network.
A. Entities
An OpenFlow network consists of a set of nodes(controller
and switches). Every node has a set of ports which connect
nodes together. In addition to ports, switches also have a set
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Fig. 7: Packet flow through an OpenFlow switch.
1 abstract sig Node{contained:one Network, ports:some Port}
2 some sig Switch extends Node{tables: some Table, root: one
3 RootTable}
4 some sig Controller extends Node{control:some Switch}
5 sig Port{connect:lone Port}
6 one sig Network{content:some Node}
7 sig Packet{srcIP: one IP, destIP: one IP, preTable,
8 postTable : lone Table }
9 some sig Message{msgInPort: one Port, packet: one Packet,
10 type: one MsgType}
11 abstract sig MsgType{}
12 one sig ControllMsgType extends MsgType{}
13 one sig HostMsgType extends MsgType{}
Fig. 8: A network model consists of nodes, packets and messages.
Lines 12 and 13 model two types of incoming messages.
of flow tables. The root table is the first table which the pipe-
lining process for an incoming packet starts with. Every packet
has a source and a destination IP. If packet is coming from the
controller, it also includes a preTable and a postTable
which reflect the modification need to be done in switch’s flow
tables. Using this modification (preTable will be replaced
by postTable). In our model each packet is encapsulated in
a message which specifies the type of message and the port the
packet was received on. The Alloy model of different elements
of an OpenFlow network is presented in Figure 8.
The most important part of the switch model is the flow
tables. The tables are uniquely determined by their tableID and
all the tables (except the last table) have a pointer to the next
table. Every flow table includes a set of flow entries, which
messages are checked against. If none of the entries match a
message, a table miss occurs. Table miss can be continuing
pipe-line process with the next table, forwarding message to
some controllers or dropping the packet. Tables and related
elements are modeled depicted in Figure 9.
As described in section III each flow entry contains match
fields, counter and instructions. Our simplified modeling of
different types of actions and instructions and their relation
with each other and with respect to the flow entries is presented
in Figure 10. For more detail on instructions and actions
and their relation you can refer to section III or OpenFlow
specification [17].
1 sig Table {nxTable:lone Table, entries: set FlowEntry,
2 tableID: one Int, miss: lone TableMiss}
3 sig RootTable extends Table {}
4 abstract sig TableMiss{}
5 one sig MissDrop extends TableMiss{}
6 one sig MissNext extends TableMiss{}
Fig. 9: Every flow table contains some flow entries and has a
corresponding action for packet miss occurrence.
1 sig FlowEntry {match: one MatchField, counters: some
2 Counter, instructs: one Instruction, flowID: one Int}
3 abstract sig Instruction{}
4 sig ApplyActionsIntruct extends Instruction{appActions:
5 set Action}
6 sig WriteActionsIntruct extends Instruction{wrtActions:
7 set Action}
8 sig ClearActionIntruct extends Instruction{}
9 sig GotoTableIntruct extends Instruction{gotoTable: one
10 Table}
11 abstract sig Action {}
12 sig ForwardtoPort extends Action{toPort: one Port}
13 one sig ForwardtoAll extends Action{}
14 one sig ForwardtoIngress extends Action{}
15 sig ForwardtoController extends Action{toController: one
16 Controller}
17 one sig Drop extends Action{}
Fig. 10: Definition of flow entries, different instructions and actions.
B. Constraints on Network Entities
The model of OpenFlow switch imposes some constraints
on the network entities. These constraints help us to get a
correct model of structure of an OpenFlow network. In this
section we will try to capture those important rules. The fact
in Figure 11 ensures that all of the switches are controlled
by at least one controller and the controller and switch are
connected. Based on the OpenFlow specification, each switch
has at least one flow table. There is exactly one table as the
root table which the pipe-lining process starts from. The set
of tables of a switch create a loop free chain. Each table
has some (at least one) flow entry. Also each table has a
table miss action. This table miss action can be explicit or
implicit. Implicit means there is no specific action assigned
for a table, hence the default action must be applied. Different
table miss actions and the behaviour of a switch for each
one is presented in section V. In order to make sure that our
model conforms to all these rules, a group of Alloy rules are
needed. The combination of these rules presented in Figure 12
ensure a model representative of the specification. For instance,
lines 11-18 take care of following rules: 1) there is only one
connected acyclic chain of tables in each switch, 2) all of the
tables in the chain belong to the same switch and 3) there
is only one last table in this chain which its pointer to next
table is empty. All constraints on flow entries are presented
in Figure 13. Each flow entry is contained in only one table
and every counter is contained in at least one flow entry.
1 fact{all s: Switch |some p1: s.ports, c:Controller, p2:
2 c.ports | s in c.control && p2 in p1.connect}
Fig. 11: Every OpenFlow switch is controlled by at least one
controller and they are connected to each other.
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1 fact{all t: Table | one s: Switch | t in s.tables}
2 fact{all t: RootTable | one s: Switch | t in s.root}
3 fact {all m:TableMiss | some t:Table | m in t.miss}
4 fact {all t:Table | #(t.entries) > 0}
5 fact {all s : Switch | one r: RootTable | r in s.tables}
6 fact{all s:Switch | s.root in s.tables}
7 fact {all t:RootTable | t.tableID = 0}
8 fact {all t:Table | t.tableID >= 0}
9 fact nextTableID{all t,t’:Table | (t’ = t.nxTable) implies
10 (t’.tableID = t.tableID.plus[1])}
11 fact {all s: Switch, t:s.tables | !(t in RootTable)
12 implies (one t’:Table | t’.nxTable = t)}
13 fact {all s:Switch, t: s.tables | t.nxTable in s.tables}
14 fact{no t: Table | t.nxTable = t}
15 fact {all s:Switch | one t: s.tables | no t.nxTable}
16 fact acyclicTable { no t: Table | t in t.ˆnxTable }
17 fact {all s:Switch, t, t’: s.tables | !(t = t’) implies
18 !(t.nxTable = t’.nxTable)}
19 fact {all t:Table | #(t.nxTable) = 0 implies !(MissNext
20 in t.miss)}
21 }
Fig. 12
1 fact {all e: FlowEntry | one t: Table | e in t.entries}
2 fact {all c: Counter | some e: FlowEntry | c in
3 e.counters}
4 fact {all a: Action | (a in ApplyActionsIntruct.appActions)
5 or (a in WriteActionsIntruct.wrtActions)}
Fig. 13: All related facts on flow entries of a table.
Line 4 also implies that every action is used in at least one
instruction. Obviously in any network model each node (switch
or controller) has some ports. Every port belongs to exactly one
node and it cannot be connected to another port in the same
node. Also each port can be connected to at most one other
port and all connections are two ways. All these structural
rules are applied using facts in Figure 12. In our model we
are not interested in relations between controllers, hence line
8 imposes that controller’s ports should be connected only
to switch’s ports. The first fact in Figure 15 implies every
instruction should belong to at least one flow entry. In addition
in the GotoTableIntruct instruction, the pointed table
must be in the corresponding switch and it must be a table
with larger ID. In Figure 16 the set of facts on different type
1 fact {all p: Port | one n:Node | p in n.ports}
2 fact {no n:Node, p: n.ports | p.connect in n.ports}
3 fact {all p: Port | #(p.connect) <=1}
4 fact {all p, p’: Port | (p = p’.connect) <=>
5 (p’ = p.connect)}
6 fact{all s: Switch |some p1: s.ports, c:Controller, p2:
7 c.ports | s in c.control && p2 in p1.connect}
8 fact {all p: Port | p in Controller.ports implies
9 p.connect in Switch.ports}
Fig. 14: Constraints on the ports and connections between them.
1 fact {all i: Instruction | some f: FlowEntry | i in
2 f.instructs}
3 fact {all s:Switch, t:s.tables, e: t.entries, i:
4 e.instructs | (i in GotoTableIntruct) implies
5 ((i.gotoTable in s.tables) and (i.gotoTable.tableID >
6 t.tableID) )}
Fig. 15: Facts on flow entry’s instructions.
1 fact {all a: Action | (a in
2 ApplyActionsIntruct.appActions) or (a in
3 WriteActionsIntruct.wrtActions)}
4 fact {all a: ForwardtoPort, s:Switch | ( (a in
5 s.tables.entries.instructs.appActions) or (a
6 in s.tables.entries.instructs.wrtActions) ) implies
7 (a.toPort in s.ports) }
8 fact {all f, f’:ForwardtoPort | !(f = f’) implies
9 !(f.toPort = f’.toPort) }
10 fact {all f, f’:ForwardtoController | !(f = f’) implies
11 !(f.toController = f’.toController) }
Fig. 16: Facts on actions in a flow table.
1 sig SwitchState{
2 switch: one Switch, sTables: some Table,
3 sInBuffMsg: set Message,
4 sOutBuffMsg: set(Port-> Message),
5 sTEntries: set FlowEntry, pInHistory: set Message,
6 pOutHistory: set (Port->Message),
7 nxtInPLTable: lone Table,
8 inPL: lone Message, actionSet: set Action,
9 outPL: lone Message
10 }
Fig. 17: Definition of a switch’s state. Important elements of a
SwitchState are sInBuffMsg, sOutBuffMsg, pInHistory
and pOutHistory. Respectively these elements present the set of
buffered for processing, buffered for forwarding, saved in input his-
tory and saved in output history messages. Beside, nxtInPLTable,
inPL, actionSet and outPL are used to handle the behavior of
switch during the switch’s table pipe-lining process. nxtInPLTable
keeps the next table that must be used for flow entry matching. inPL
and outPL denote the message that is checked against flow entries
in pipe-lining process. actionSet keeps a record of actions that
are being added whenever a match is found for the message. Also
notice that since the by arrival of a control Messages, the flow entries
of the tables may change. Hence the set of tables and entries of a
switch is also kept in the switch’s state (modeled by sTables and
sTEntries respectively).
of actions is given. The second fact in line 4 imposes that the
toPort of an ForwardtoPort action must be in the same
switch. Finally lines 8 and 10 make sure there is no repeated
actions in our model.
V. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR OF THE MODEL
In the previous section the static model of an OpenFlow
switch network was presented. Assuming that this model
presents the (simplified) real structure of a OpenFlow switch
network correctly, the dynamic behavior of OpenFlow switch
can be modeled now. Without loss of generality, the internal
behavior of only one switch in relation with other elements
of network is considered. The internal state of a specific
switch changes by various events such as receiving, sending
or processing of a message and etc. In Figure 17 you can see
how the state of an OpenFlow switch is captured. As you see
every element that may change in a switch is considered as
a part of the internal state of a switch. In order to have a
correct chain of switch states, the first SwitchState must
be initialized. For instance the set of input/output buffered
messages in this state must be empty. This rule is applied to the
first SwitchState using Alloy fact presented in Figure 18.
The core part of modeling the dynamic behavior of the switch
is to capture the possible transitions between different states.
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1 fact {
2 no first.sInBuffMsg && no first.pInHistory &&
3 no first.pOutHistory && no first.sOutBuffMsg &&
4 first.switch.tables = first.sTables &&
5 no first.sTEntries && no first.nxtInPLTable &&
6 no first.inPL && no first.actionSet &&
7 no first.outPL
8 }
Fig. 18: Using this fact the first state is initialized. first
is a reserved keyword in order library referring to the first
SwitchState.
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Fig. 19: Five possible state transitions that are considered in our
modeling.
Possible transitions that we have considered in our model
are schematically presented in Figure 19. In our model the
pipe-lining procedure is considered as an atomic transition.
Hence until the whole pipe-lining is done, no new message
will be received or forwarded. In order to make modeling
easier the pipe-lining is broken down into two parts, Pipe-
Line initiation and Pipe-Lining. All these five state transitions
are implemented and described by five major Alloy predicates
as we explain in following subsections.
A. Receiving a Message
The first state change happens by receiving a new message.
Hence the only change in switch state is adding a new message
into the input buffer and input history of the switch. All
other elements of SwitchState are remained unchanged by
receiving a new message. These rules are applied by two con-
ditions: ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg + m and
ss’.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory + m. This tran-
sition is modeled using the receive predicate presented in
Figure 20.
B. Pipe-Line Initiation
As mentioned before a received message is buffered in the
switch and recorded in the input history. In general, a message
is either a control message or a host message. Control mes-
sages are used to change the flow entries or flow tables in the
switch. If the message is a host message, however, pipelining
1 pred recieve(ss,ss’ : SwitchState, m:Message){
2 #(Port->m & (ss’.pOutHistory)) = 0
3 #(Port->m & (ss.pOutHistory)) = 0
4 #(Port->m & (ss’.sOutBuffMsg)) = 0
5 #(Port->m & (ss.sOutBuffMsg)) = 0
6 !(m in ss.sInBuffMsg)
7 ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg + m
8 !(m in (ss.pInHistory))
9 ss’.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory + m
10 ss’.sInBuffMsg in ss’.pInHistory
11 ss.sInBuffMsg in ss’.pInHistory
12 ss’.pOutHistory = ss.pOutHistory
13 ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg
14 ss’.sTables = ss.sTables
15 ss’.sTEntries = ss.sTEntries
16 no(ss’.actionSet)
17 no(ss.actionSet)
18 no(ss’.outPL)
19 no(ss.outPL)
20 no(ss’.nxtInPLTable)
21 no(ss.nxtInPLTable)
22 no(ss’.inPL)
23 no(ss.inPL)
24 ss’.switch = ss.switch
25 }
Fig. 20: Predicate receive: ss represent the state of switch before
receiving the message m and ss’ is the state of switch after receiving
message m. The first four lines apply the condition that the new
message m is not a repeated message. In line 7 and 9 it’s stated
that the only difference between ss and ss’ is addition of message
m to input buffer and input history. Other elements of the switch’s
state are conditioned to remain unchanged in this predicate.
can be initiated. Predicate pipeLineInit as presented in
Figure 21 shows this state transition. In this predicate condition
ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg - m makes sure
that message m is removed from the input buffer. Lines 17 to 27
handle the message based on its type. Lines 17 to 22 model
the behavior of switch for a control message. In these lines
the set of tables of switch (modeled by sTables) changes
by replacing the preTable with postTable of arrived
message from controller. The way that flow entries of tables
are manipulated in our model is slightly different from the
OpenFlow specification [17]. In our model we have simplified
this process. Instead of removing or adding a single entry in a
specific table, the table is replaced with the updated table. In
lines 24 to 27 if the message is of type host message it is set
to start pipe-lining in the next state.
C. Pipe-Lining Predicate
The core of the modeling of the dynamic behavior of a
OpenFlow switch is the pipe-lining process. In this procedure
the message is pulled out of the input buffer and, starting from
the root table, is compared with flow entries. This predicate
has two important parts. In every round of pipe-lining either
there is exactly one flow entry in the current table in pipe-
line that matches the message, or no entry matches it. In the
former case using predicate applyInstruction (presented
in Figure 24) the set of instructions for the matched flow entry
is applied to the message. On the other hand, in the latter case,
we are facing a table miss. Hence the appropriate action (based
on the table’s miss action) must be carried out. the table’s miss
action can be dropping the message, carrying pipe-lining up
using subsequent table or the default action, which is sending
the message to connected controller(s).
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1 pred pipeLineInit(ss,ss’ : SwitchState, m:Message){
2 ss’.switch = ss.switch
3 ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg - m
4 ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg
5 ss’.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory
6 (m in ss.sInBuffMsg)
7 (m in ss.pInHistory)
8 #(Port->m & (ss.pOutHistory)) = 0
9 #(Port->m & (ss.sOutBuffMsg)) = 0
10 ss’.pOutHistory = ss.pOutHistory
11 no(ss.nxtInPLTable)
12 no(ss.inPL)
13 no(ss.outPL)
14 no(ss.actionSet)
15 no(ss’.actionSet)
16
17 m.type = ControllMsgType implies
18 ((ss’.sTables = ss.sTables - m.packet.preTable
19 + m.packet.postTable) and (ss’.sTEntries = ss.sTEntries
20 - m.packet.preTable.entries + m.packet.postTable.entries)
21 and (no ss’.nxtInPLTable) and (no ss’.inPL) and
22 (no ss’.outPL))
23
24 m.type = HostMsgType implies
25 (ss’.sTables = ss.sTables and ss’.inPL = m and
26 ss’.outPL = m and ss’.nxtInPLTable = ss.switch.root and
27 ss’.sTEntries = ss.sTEntries)
28 }
Fig. 21: Predicate pipeLineInit: Same as predicate recieve,
ss represent the state of switch before happening of pipe-line
initiation and ss’ is the state of switch after initializing message m
in pipe-line. In lines 24 to 27 if the message is of type host mes-
sage, using condition ss’.inPL = m and ss’.outPL = m
message it is set to start pipe-lining. Also the condition
ss’.nxtInPLTable = ss.switch.root implies that the
pipe-lining must starts with the root table of the switch.
The pipe-lining procedure is modeled using predicate
pipeLining presented in Figure 22.
D. Message Forwarding Predicate
After being pipelined, a message is usually forwarded via
a switch port. Hence a message may be added to some ports’
output buffer. forward predicate (Figure 25 ) models the
process of removing one message from output buffer, and
forwarding it via the corresponding port.
E. Transition Between States
In our model it is assumed that transitions are atomic
actions. Namely from any current switch’s state ss to the exact
next state ss’, only one of aforementioned five transitions can
happen. In order to apply this rule, we add some conditions
in a fact shown in Figure 26. In this fact it is applied that
between any two consecutive state ss and ss’, exactly one
of the discussed predicates can be correct. In addition each
transition happens only for one message.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In Veriflow [9] the problem of checking invariants in
software defined networks’ data plane in real time is ad-
dressed. The authors proposed to divide the network into
equivalent classes so that checking invariants and violations
become easier and more efficient. Conflicting rules can be
detected in real time but rules that rewrite packets cannot
be checked by Veriflow. Anteater [12] statically analyzes the
1 pred pipeLining(ss,ss’ : SwitchState){
2 ss’.switch = ss.switch
3 ss’.sTables = ss.sTables
4 ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg
5 ss’.sTEntries = ss.sTEntries
6 ss’.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory
7 ss’.pOutHistory = ss.pOutHistory
8 #(ss.inPL) = 1
9
10 (
11 one f:ss.nxtInPLTable.entries |
12 match[ss, ss.inPL, f, ss.nxtInPLTable] and
13 applyInstruction[ss, ss’, f] and
14 ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg
15 and ss’.outPL = ss.outPL)
16 or
17 all f:ss.nxtInPLTable.entries|
18 !match[ss, ss.inPL, f, ss.nxtInPLTable] and
19 (
20 ((ss.nxtInPLTable.miss in MissDrop) and
21 (no ss’.nxtInPLTable) and (no ss’.inPL) and
22 (no ss’.actionSet) and
23 (ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg) and
24 (no ss’.outPL))
25 or
26 ((ss.nxtInPLTable.miss in MissNext) and
27 (ss’.nxtInPLTable = ss.nxtInPLTable.nxTable) and
28 (ss’.inPL = ss.inPL) && (ss’.actionSet =ss.actionSet)
29 (ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg) and
30 (ss’.outPL = ss.outPL))
31 or
32 ((no ss.nxtInPLTable.miss) and (no ss’.nxtInPLTable)
33 and (no ss’.inPL) and (no ss’.actionSet) and
34 (ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg +
35 findCntrlPort[Controller, ss.switch.ports]->ss.inPL)
36 and (no ss’.outPL))
37 )
38 )
39 }
Fig. 22: Predicate pipeLineInit: Same as predicate recieve,
ss represent the state of switch before carrying out pipe-lining on
one table and ss’ is the state of switch after pipe-lining. In each
round of pipe-lining a message is compared againt the flow entries
of table nxtInPLTable. If a match is found, using predicate
applyInstruction (lines 11 to 15) corresponding instructions
are applied to the packet. If no match is found, then based on table’s
miss action one of conditions of lines 17 to 37 must be true.
1 pred match(m:Message,f:FlowEntry,t:Table){
2 simpleMatch[m,f,t] and
3 (no f’: FlowEntry |
4 !(f = f’) and simpleMatch[m, f’, t] and
5 f’.match.priority < f.match.priority)
6 }
7
8 pred simpleMatch(m:Message, f: FlowEntry, t:Table){
9 f in t.entries
10 f.match.matchPort = m.msgInPort or no f.match.matchPort
11 f.match.srcIP = m.packet.srcIP or no f.match.srcIP
12 f.match.destIP = m.packet.destIP or no f.match.destIP
13 (#(f.match.matchPort)!=0 or
14 #(f.match.srcIP)!=0 or #(f.match.destIP)!=0))
15 }
Fig. 23: Predicate match: This predicate checks if message m
matches the flow entry f in table t and more importantly there is no
other flow entry in t with lower priority that matches m (based on
matching rule in OpenFlow specification [17]).
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1 pred applyInstruction(ss,ss’ : SwitchState, f: FlowEntry){
2 (#(f.instructs & ClearActionIntruct) > 0) implies
3 (ss’.actionSet =
4 (f.instructs & WriteActionsIntruct).wrtActions)
5 else
6 (ss’.actionSet = ss.actionSet +
7 (f.instructs & WriteActionsIntruct).wrtActions)
8
9 (#(f.instructs & GotoTableIntruct) = 1) implies
10 (ss’.nxtInPLTable =
11 (f.instructs & GotoTableIntruct).gotoTable and
12 ss’.inPL = ss.inPL)
13 else
14 ((no ss’.inPL) and (no ss’.nxtInPLTable) )
15 }
Fig. 24: Predicate applyInstruction: This predicate applies the
set of instructions of flow entry f to the message that is currently in
pipe-line process.
1 pred forward(ss,ss’ : SwitchState, m:Message, p:Port){
2 ss’.switch = ss.switch
3 ss’.sTables = ss.sTables
4 ss’.sTEntries = ss.sTEntries
5 (p in ss.switch.ports)
6 (p in ss’.switch.ports)
7 (p->m in ss.sOutBuffMsg)
8 !(m in ss.sInBuffMsg)
9 (m in (ss.pInHistory))
10 !(p->m in (ss.pOutHistory))
11 ss’.sOutBuffMsg = ss.sOutBuffMsg - p->m
12 ss’.pOutHistory = ss.pOutHistory + p->m
13 ss’.pInHistory = ss.pInHistory
14 ss’.sInBuffMsg = ss.sInBuffMsg
15 no ss’.nxtInPLTable
16 no ss.nxtInPLTable
17 no ss’.inPL
18 no ss.inPL
19 no ss’.actionSet
20 no ss.actionSet
21 no ss’.outPL
22 no ss.outPL
23 }
Fig. 25: Predicate forward: ss represent the state of switch before
forwarding message m and ss’ is the state of switch after forwarding
it via port p. As you see the only changes between ss and ss’ are
modeled conditions in lines 11 and 12. Respectively in these lines
message is removed from output buffer and added to output history.
dataplane configuration to check isolation errors and lack of
connectivity due to misconfigurations. Anteater translates high
level network invariants into SAT instances and use a SAT
solver to check them and returns the counterexamples. Anteater
cannot scale well to dynamic network changes and it takes
too long to check invariants. In [8] network reachability is
examined. To achieve this, a minimal set of packets which
are required to cover all rules or links in the network is
computed. Then in [18] these packets are sent periodically
to all the nodes to check for network failures and errors.
[6] introduces ndb, a prototype network debugger inspired by
gdb, which implements breakpoints and packet backtraces for
SDN which enables debuggers to track down the cause of an
error. In [15] introduces consistent network updates in which
behaviors are guaranteed to be preserved when a packet it
traversing the network. It will enable us to check consistency
after transitioning between configurations, but it requires us to
store a huge number of extra rules in switches.
1 fact switchStateTransition{
2 all ss: SwitchState, ss’ : ss.next {
3 (
4 (one m:Message | recieve[ss, ss’, m] ) and
5 (no m:Message, p:Port | forward[ss, ss’, m, p] ) and
6 (no m:Message | pipeLineInit[ss, ss’, m] ) and
7 !pipeLining[ss,ss’] and
8 !applyActionSet[ss,ss’]
9 )
10 or
11 (
12 (no m:Message | recieve[ss, ss’, m] ) and
13 (one m:Message, p:Port | forward[ss, ss’, m, p] ) and
14 (no m:Message | pipeLineInit[ss, ss’, m] ) and
15 !pipeLining[ss,ss’] and
16 !applyActionSet[ss,ss’]
17 )
18 or
19 (
20 (no m:Message | recieve[ss, ss’, m] ) and
21 (no m:Message, p:Port | forward[ss, ss’, m, p] ) and
22 (one m:Message | pipeLineInit[ss, ss’, m] ) and
23 !pipeLining[ss,ss’] and
24 !applyActionSet[ss,ss’]
25 )
26 or
27 (
28 (no m:Message | recieve[ss, ss’, m] ) and
29 (no m:Message, p:Port | forward[ss, ss’, m, p] ) and
30 (no m:Message | pipeLineInit[ss, ss’, m] ) and
31 pipeLining[ss,ss’] and
32 !applyActionSet[ss,ss’]
33 )
34 or
35 (
36 (no m:Message | recieve[ss, ss’, m] ) and
37 (no m:Message, p:Port | forward[ss, ss’, m, p] ) and
38 (no m:Message | pipeLineInit[ss, ss’, m] ) and
39 !pipeLining[ss,ss’] and
40 applyActionSet[ss,ss’]
41 )
42 }
43 }
Fig. 26: Predicate switchStateTransition: between any two
switch’s state ss and ss’ only one transition happens. Therefore
only one predicate is logically true.
[11] introduces SOFT, an approach to test interoperability
of Openflow switches and inconsistency between different
Openflow agents and the cause of inconsistency.
FlowChecker [3] tries to find intra-switch misconfigura-
tions. FlowChecker translates FlowTable configurations into
boolean expressions using Binary Decision diagrams(BDD)
and then checks network invariants by using model checkers.
In [2] the whole network is modelled as a finite state
machine in which packet header and the location determines
states. The goal of paper is to check correctness of network
reachability per packet.To achieve this, authors have used
BDDs and model checking on properties specified in com-
putation tree logic(CTL) to test all future and past states of
packet in the network .
[16] studies inconsistencies caused by updating switch con-
figurations. Authors tries to keep Openflow network consistent
at the cost of increasing state in switches to store duplicate
table entries.
In addition to switch behavior, a considerable amount
of literature has been published with a focus on Openflow
controllers. For example, NICE [4] is a controller verification
tool which uses model checking and symbolic execution to
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automate testing Openflow applications. Nice attempts to ex-
plore the state space of the whole network and find the invalid
system states.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
The final goal of this research is to use the Alloy Analyzer
to generate a model for lightweight verification of OpenFlow
switches in order to help researchers in analyzing OpenFlow
switch networks’ properties. So far the modeling of static
structure and also modeling as well as the internal states and
dynamic behavior of OpenFlow switch have been considered,
specifically matching rules and actions in table entries as a
part of a real size network. Consequently, in future works,
there are some desired properties that we aim to investigate.
Some important properties that will be investigated are:
• Conflicting rules in aggregate flow table
• Existence of loops in the set of forwarding actions
• Scheduling problem in the existence of different con-
trollers
In the follow up research, using Alloy Analyzer, we will try
to check these properties of OpenFlow switch networks in our
model.
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